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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DOROTHY BLACK, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
ROBERT L. McKNIGHT, 
Defendant-Respondant. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No.14 724 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
This Appeal raises the issue whether a new trial should 
be granted to a party (appellant) who was rear-ended in a 
motor vehicle collision by the respondant's motor vehicle and the 
Trial Court failed to submit to the jury appellant's two 
principal theories as to the cause of the collision, which were 
fully substantiated by both direct and circumstantial evidence. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
A trial was held before the Honorable G. Hal Taylor, District 
Judge of the Third Judicial District, sitting with a jury on 
the 2nd, 3rd and 4th days of June, 1976. A general verdict was 
returned by the jury finding in favor of the respondant and 
against the appellant on June 4, 1976. On June 14, 1976, appellant 
moved for a new trial on the basis of the Trial Court's failure 
to instruct the jury on appellant's two principal theories of the 
case. Appellant's motion for a new trial was denied by the 
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Honorable G. Hal Taylor on July 19, 1976. Thereafter, on 
Auqust 9, 1976, appellant timely filed a Notice of Appeal to 
this co111rt. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
~&fpellant respectfully requests this Court to grant 
aPPWJ,-'lant a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On March S, 1970, at approximately 12:30 a.m., on u.s. 
VS s tl in Davis County, state of Utah, a collision 
G&CAlXed between a vehicle driven by the respondant and a 
1N!IUicle driven by the appellant • (T.3) Visibility was clear 
..a - road conditions were dry. (T. 5) Appellant was 
.. ., !1f!)l11~ 
. 1:JSl'Vl&.1ing en route from Brigham City with her now dee eased sister' 
> f.)ftl')f'; .• 
as a passenger , south on Highway 91, in the outside lane 
of tbe highway. (T. 4, 6) About a quarter of a mile past 
fth:i· 
the Kaysville elevators appellant noticed a vehicle with flashing 
red and white lights parked off to the side of the highway 
in the holding lane. (T. 6) Appellant believed that the vehicle I 
1 
".· in the holding lane was a patrol car because of the flashing. .1 
white and red lights. (T. 6) Appellant was traveling approx1mate11 
60 miles per hour at this point in time. (T. 6) Traffic at that! I 
time of night, on the date of the collision, was moderate. I 
i (T. 7) At the time of the collision, Highway 91 was divided bY 11 
I 
white dividing stripe separating the southbound and northbound~ 
I 
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of traffic. (T. 7) 7here were two lanes for both southbound 
and northbound traffic. (T. 7) 
After appellant noticed the highway patrol car parked off 
to the side of Highway 91 in a holding lane, (said patrol car was 
parked in a southerly direction on the same side of the highway as 
appellant was traveling) appellant noticed two horses walking 
from the inside lane of traffic to the outside lane of the 
two southerly lanes of travel on Highway 91. (T. 8) When 
the horses were approximately in front of appellant's vehicle, 
appellant slowed down and glanced in her rear view mirror. (T. 8). 
Appellant saw no lights behind her vehicle at this time. (T. 8) 
Appellant then signaled a left turn from the outside lane 
to the inside lane in order not to collide with the horses and 
to allow them to proceed across the highway. (T. 8) 
After the horses had proceeded across the highway, 
appellant signaled for a right turn from the inside lane to the 
outside lane of travel. (T. 9) After appellant had signaled, 
and had entered the outside lane of travel, she consulted 
her rear view mirror and saw headlights bearing down on her 
vehicle from the rear. (T.9) 
Appellant's vehicle then was struck in the left rear section 
by respondant's vehicle. (T. 10) The impact of the collision 
was so violent that it caused appellant's vehicle to flip 
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over several times causing serious and permanent personal injur)E,: 
I 
to plaintiff, 
It was defendant-respondant' s contention at trial that the 
\,.,. ' . 
. . . collision actually occurred in the inside southbound lane of 
,:~;.: . 
•• '.\&'!>, .. 
, -- tig)Btay 91 on the night of the collision, which contention was 
fJJl>irlpir! •.· t~~ly supported by the eye witness testimony of the police 
;.:,.r., .,_, ,·. 
officer whose car was parked in the holding lane next to the 
......._:r and who witnessed intermittent movements of the appellant'! 
..a .....,.:m.dant's vehicles prior to the collision. (T. 24, 61, 611, 
lle.spondant admitted under cross examination that he was I 
· ·~,. tile fourth week of working the swing shift at Hill Air 
··· ........ ·;s a production control specialist. (T. 68, 69, 70). 
Force I 
-<\: 
'~nt also admitted under cross examination that the 
&Wint shift commenced at 3:30 p.m. and continued until 12:00 
p.a. at niqht. (T. 70) Respondant testified that he observed 
a vehicle parked in the holding lane, that he noticed white tail 
liqhts in the back of the car. (T. 62, 72) • Respondant 
estimated that his speed prior to the collision was between 
60 and 65 miles per hour. (T. 73) It was respondant' s 
testimony that he was attempting to overtake appellant's 
vehicle which was traveling south in the outside lane of travel 
when appellant's vehicle made an abrupt turn and swerved 
I 
I 
into respondant's lane of travel. (T. 62) Respondant contended' 
that prior to this abrupt turn appellant gave no manual or 
mechanical turn signal. (T. 63) 
-4-
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At the conclusion of trial, the Trial Court submitted all 
of respondant's principal theories as to the cause of the 
collision with appellant's vehicle in its Intruction No. 13 to 
the jury. The Trial Court, however, did not submit all 
of appellant's principal theories as to the cause of the collision. 
It was appellant's contention that respondant's vehicle was 
following appellant's vehicle more closely than was reasonable 
and prudent under the then existing circumstances, and that 
respondant's vehicle was traveling at a rate of speed greater 
than was necessary to avoid colliding with appellant's vehicle. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURTS FAILURE TO SUBMIT APPELLANT'S PROPOSED 
INSTRUCTIONS NO.'S 12(d) AND 13, WHICH WERE BASED UPON SECTION 
41-6-62(a), UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, TO THE JURY WAS PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR. 
Appellant assigns as error the trial courts· failure to 
submit to the jury appellant's proposed instructions No.'s 12(d) 
and 13, which were predicated upon Section 41-6-62{a), Utah Code 
Annotated. 
UTAH CODE ANN., Section 41-6-62(a) (1954), provides: 
-5-
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; (a) The driver of a motor vehicle shall not 
follow another vehicle more closely than is 
;#easonable and prudent, having due regard 
for the speed of such vehicle and the traffic 
lllfOll and the condition of the highway •••• 
llflellant submits that there was abundant, direct and 
, Ip ••tial evidence illicited at trial sufficient to 
to submit to the jury the issue embodied 
and incorporated in the appellant's 
Instructions No.'s 12(d) and 13. 
~........._. appellant proffered the following direct 
·•••• 5' , .. 
(t,l 
.. ~ 
now, why don't you pick up when 
police car and tell us what happened? 
Then as we proceeded down there 
we noticed coming in front of us. 
llow, were they large horses, Mrs. Black? 
.••{ll •~ ; A. Yes. One seemed taller than the other 
becau.se one was light and one was dark. And this is 
~ "'1111atl made it stand out. First I saw the light horse. 
a.<' 
·' 
Q. How did you happen to notice that 
there were horses? 
A. Well, I had my lights on high. 
Q. And why was that? 
A. Because -- well, there wasn't that much 
traffic. And of course whenever there was a car we 
would dim, but there wasnt' enough traffic on the 
north bound freeway to really be a problem. So I 
was driving with my lights on high. 
Q. So the horses were travelling from the 
inside lane to the outside lanei is that correct? 
-6-
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A. Right, going across. 
Q. 
A. 
about in 
so as I 
Were they running or were they walking? 
They were walking. And they were just 
front of us proceeding on the -- on across, 
saw them I slowed down and glanced in my 
rear view mirror. I didn't see any light behind me. 
I signaled a left turn and moved out around. And of 
course the horses proceeded on across. 
I signaled a right turn and backed in and almost 
at this time when I glanced up I saw the lights bearing 
~ 
Q. Now, Mrs. Black, when you were in the 
inside lane, I believe you said you signaled to make 
a right hand turn to go back into the right hand lane? 
A. Right. 
Q. And I believe you said you consulted your 
rear view mirror. Did you have a side view mirror on 
your vehicle? 
A. Yes. I have a side. 
Q. Did you use that? 
A. No. 
Q. Why was that? 
A. I am not really secure with the side. I 
mean I don't feel that this can see all that you need 
to. And of course the time involved I just glanced up 
in the rear view mirror and proceeded to make my turn. 
Q. Now, when you were in the outside 
lane originally and you made your left hand tu:n 
to the inside lane, did you ever see any headlights? 
Did you ever see any vehicle behind you? 
A. No, sir, not at any time. 
Q And after you were in the inside lane 
and the 0 horses had passed you and you th~n signaled t<;> 
go in the outside lane, did you ever notice any headlights 
in the mirror? 
-7-
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A. After I proceeded around in this manner 
in coming back in, and as I looked up I saw headlights 
bearing down. 
Q. 
A. 
,e,, 
Q. 
t· ,. 
A. 
Q. 
J\i-
Q. 
A. 
O.K. 
From the rear. 
What happened next, Mrs. Black? 
Well, we were struck on the left, or the left side, 
So his right front struck your car? 
Struck the left. 
Left rear of your car? 
Right. II (T. 8, 9, 10) 
submits the fact that the respondant' s vehicle 
'with the rear end of appellant's vehicle is 
In addition, respondant •,s own direct testimony was 
Q. "Then what happened? 
A. We collided. 
Q. 
hers? 
, " 
A. 
tlle front 
maybe the 
her car." 
And what portion of your car with what portion of 
Well, I'd judge about 14 to 18 inches of 
right bumper on my car hit approximately 
same area on the left rear bumper of 
(T. 63) 
Appellant contends that the direct testimony of the appellant 
and the uncontroverted fact that appellant was rear-ended by 
-8-
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respondant's vehicle was sufficient evidence to compel 
the trial court to submit appellant's proposed jury instructions 
No.'s 12(d) and 13, which were predicated upon Section 41-6-62(a), 
Utah Code Annotated. The Jury should have been required to decide 
whether the respondant was following appellant's motor vehicle 
more closely than was reasonable and prudent under the existing 
circumstances, and failure by the trial court to do so, constituted 
prejudicial error. 
POINT 2 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE '.ID SUBMIT APPELLANT'S PROPOSED JURY 
INSTRUCTION NO. 14 WHICH WAS PREDICATED UPON 41-6-46(a), 
Utah Code Annotated, WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR. 
Appellant assigns as error the trial court's failure to 
submit proposed instruction No. 14 which was predicated upon 
Utah Code Ann. Section 41-6-46(a) (1954) to the jury. 
Utah Code Ann. Section 41-6-46(a) (1954), provides: 
No person shall drive a vehicle on a · 
highway at a speed greater than is reasonable 
and prudent under the conditions and having 
regard to the actual and potential hazards 
then existing. In every event speed shall be 
so controlled as may be necessary to avoid 
colliding with any person, vehicle, or other con-
veyance on or entering the highway in compliance 
with legal requirements and the duty of all persons 
to use due care. 
The trial court, however, chose to give only the ~ 
sentence of Section 41-6-46 (a), in its Instruction No. 19 
to the jury. 
Appellant submits there was no logical reason for the 
trial court to bifurcate the "speed" statute in its Instruction 
-9-
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No. 19 to the jury. Appellant contends that the second 
sentence of Section 41-6-46(a), Utah Code Annotated, 
'(•) 0-
elarJ:~; 
incorporates the holding in Dalley v. Mid-Western Dairy Prod!:£!!.~ 
Co., 80 U. 331, 15 P.2d 309 (1932) • 
• 1,r-
In the Dalley case this court said: 
In this jurisdiction the doctrine is established 
that it is negligence as a matter of law for a person 
to drive an automobile upon a travelled public highway, 
used by vehicles and pedestrians (sic) at such a rate 
of speed that said automobile cannot be stopped within 
tbe distance at which the operator of said car is 
lllale to see objects upon the highway· in front of him. 
I W. at 336J 15 P.2d at 310. 
al.so, in O'Brien v. Alston, 61 Utah 368, 213 P. 791 (1923), 
i 
tllis Court quoted from Serfus v. Lehi, etc., Ry. co., 270 
~·ltf1 113 A. 370, the following: 
f\1'-.1• lI)t is the duty of a chauffer traveling by 
night to have such a headlight as is will enable him 
to see in advance the face of the highway and to 
discover grade crossings, or other obstacles in his 
path, in time for his own safety, and to keep such 
control of his car as will enable him to stop and 
avoid obstructions that fall within his vision. 
(emphasis added.) 
The net effect of the second sentence of Utah Code Annotat~ 
Section 41-6-46 (a)1is to add the additional speed requirement 
that "speed shall be so controlled as may be necessary to 
avoid colliding with any person, vehicle, or other conveyance, 
on or entering the highway •••• " which is in conformity with the 
-10-
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Dalley and O'Brien cases. 
Appellant agrees for the sake of this issue on appeal, 
that respondant was traveling between 60 miles per hour 
and 65 miles per hour immediately prior to the accident 
which is in conformity with respondant's testimony proffered 
at trial. (See T. 62 ) Appellant likewise concedes 
that the posted maximum speed limit along highway 91 on the 
date of the collision was 70 miles per hour. Therefore, 
Appellant submits that with these facts taken into consideration, 
in addition to the facts that it was late at night on a 
relatively deserted highway: an extremely hazardous 
situation existed on an unlighted highway: a Utah Highway 
patrol car stopped off to the side of the highway in a holding 
lane: its red lights flashing for all passing motorists to 
observe: that respondant was, if he had been at all observant, 
forewarned that there was a potentially hazardous situation 
existing on that particular portion of the highway at that 
particular time which should have caused him to slow and become 
acutely aware of the danger. It was proper for the trial 
court to submit sentence No. 1 of Section 41-6-46(a), 
Utah Code Annotated, to the jury in light of respondant's 
resultant collision with the rear end of appellant's motor 
vehicle. 
However, a critical part of that statute is likewise 
directed to the exact type of circumstance that occurred 
-11-
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in this case. It was appellant's theory that respondant 
did not properly or reasonably control his speed under the 
existing conditions so as to avoid colliding with 
tlle appellant's vehicle while he was upon the highway 
fxQJl .tbe niqht of the collision. This was true, notwithstanding 
the fact that resp~ndant's vehicle was argueably traveling 
ft 1-s than the lawful speed limit at the time of the collision. 
Jq>pellant suggests to this Honorable court that it 
- - only error for the trial court to refuse to instruct 
tllle jury on the second sentence of Section 41-6-46(a), Utah Coo 
Aall., in this case, but that in light of the uncontroverted fact 
... -.~.~espondant collided with the rear end of appellant's 
l:'rl.i ~le (an eventuality which is precisely dealt with in the 
seoond sentence of Section 41-6-46 (a), Utah Code Ann., and whict 
~. ;... an eventuality that suggests negligence on behalf of an 
offendinq motorist) and appellant's theory that the collision 
was proximately caused by respondant's failure to heed an 
officer's warning, (flashing red and white lights) and 
thereafter to fail to so control his speed, so as to 
avoid this type of collision, that it deprived the jury 
of appellant's principal theory of respondant's negligence 
which was amply supported by direct and circumstantial 
testimony and uncontroverted facts which should require this 
court to grant appellant's 11K>tion for a new trial. 
-12-
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CONCLUSION 
The instant case presents a fairly simple form of error 
on the part of the Trial Court. The Court simply did not 
instruct the jury on two key issues submitted by appellant 
as to the cause of collision between appellant's and respondant' s 
vehicles. The two issues were: (1) whether or not respondant's 
motor vehicle followed appellant's motor vehicle more closely 
than was reasonable and prudent under the existing circumstances 
and (2) whether the second sentence of Section 41-6-46(a} de~ling 
with speed causing the collision; should have been submitted to the 
Jury. The failure of the Trial Court to submit the said 
issues deprived appellant of submitting her principal theories 
of the collision to the jury after the same were fully and 
adequately supported and corroberated by direct and circumstantial 
evidence. 
The absence of instructions on these two critical issues 
left the jury uninformed on the law relative to appellant's 
theories which were adequately supported by the evidence, to 
respondant's negligence pertaining to the collision with 
appellant's vehicle. A new trial is therefore essential to 
avoid possible injustice as prejudicial error clearly resulted 
in failing to instruct the jury on appellant's principal 
-13-
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theories of the cause of the collision. 
Respectfully submitted, 
of ROMNEY, NELSON & CASSITY 
136 South Main Street 
Suite 404 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellant 
-14-
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I filed ten (10) copies of Appellant's 
Brief with the Clerk of the Supreme Court and mailed two 
(2) 
this 
copies to: 
Lou E. Midgley 
574 East 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
AttoLney for Defendant-respondant 
~'-~-day of November, 1976. 
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